Journal of Information Security Research ›› 2019, Vol. 5 ›› Issue (1): 14-22.
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Received:
2019-01-08
Online:
2019-01-15
Published:
2019-01-08
林璟锵,荆继武
通讯作者:
林璟锵
作者简介:
林璟锵
博士,研究员,主要研究方向为应用密码学、网络与系统安全.
linjingqiang@iie.ac.cn
荆继武
研究员,主要研究方向为网络空间安全、身份管理与网络信任技术、系统安全理论与技术.
jing@is.ac.cn
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